1. **What we learned from the problem analysis** – note that these findings are *preliminary* and a final report is yet to be completed.

2. **What the problem analysis suggests about the design of the Ceasefire initiative in Stockton.**

3. **Action steps** – a brief update as well as next steps.
Problem and Opportunity Analysis: Preliminary Findings
February 2013
1. With SPD’s help, we have reviewed every homicide that has taken place in Stockton over the past two years.

2. This review consists of:
   - A review of every each incident (what happened that led to the shooting?)
   - An in-depth analysis of every victim and offender’s criminal history.
   - A review of the role of gangs, crews, sets, etc.
   - A network analysis of group conflicts and alliances.

3. The purpose of the analysis is to tailor the design of the Ceasefire initiative to local needs, priorities & resources. The product is a strategic framework – the analysis does not specify individuals, gangs/groups or location.
The context: violent crime in Stockton

Homicides, 1985 - 2012
The context (2):
violent crime rate per 100,000:
Stockton v. CA
1. Over the past 28 years, Stockton has averaged 40 homicides per year. Its violent crime rate is consistently double – and sometimes more than triple – the state average.

2. Over the past five years, homicides have reached an average of 47 per year and a high of 71.

3. Anthony Braga, a criminologist at Harvard and Rutgers University, found that during the implementation of Ceasefire (1998-2002) overall homicide was reduced by 43%.
   - This was the longest period of sustained reductions in the past 28 years.
   - During that period, homicides averaged 31 per year.
# Findings: Homicide Victims & Suspects (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Victims</th>
<th>Suspects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>84.5%</td>
<td>96.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average age overall</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average age of those known to CJ system</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asian</strong></td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black</strong></td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hispanic</strong></td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>White</strong></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Historically, gangs, sets, crews and other groups play a significant role in violent crime in Stockton.

2. There are 34+/- groups citywide, but over the past two years only 18 have been actively violent.

3. These 18 groups have an active membership of approximately 700.

4. These active groups and individuals are responsible for a minimum of 50% and up to 80% of the homicides in Stockton.
1. About 73% of victims & 83% of suspects are known to the criminal justice system before the incident.

2. Victims & suspects are arrested frequently and often for very serious offenses.
   - Suspects average 8.5 arrests by the time they are 25.
   - Victims average 8.6 arrests by the time they are 28.5.
   - This does not include arrests as juveniles.

3. Approximately 30% are on probation or parole at the time of the incident.

4. Approximately 50% have been supervised by probation or parole prior to the incident.
1. Victims & suspects are arrested frequently and often for very serious offenses.

1. On average, homicide suspects have been
   - arrested every 10 months,
   - arrested for felonies about every 18 months, and
   - arrested for violent offenses about every 30 months.

2. On average, homicide victims have been
   - arrested every 15 months,
   - arrested for felonies about every 29 months, and
   - arrested for violent offenses about every 64 months.
### Findings: Wide variety of crimes (5)

#### Average Charges by Offense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Victims</th>
<th>Suspects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent offenses</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent firearm</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Industry</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Findings: Summary of group member-involved violence (6)

- No Group Member Involvement (N=24) - 19%
- Unknown Group Member Involvement (N=26) - 20%
- Yes Group Member Involvement (N=79) - 61%
Findings: Comparing Stockton to other cities (7)

1. **The role of groups and victim/suspect ages and rates of offending are roughly similar to other cities in which we have worked.**

2. **The ratio of serious offenses committed by both victims and suspects is significantly higher than other cities. This includes high rates of:**
   - violent offenses (particularly); and
   - to a lesser degree, firearms-related offenses.

3. **The distribution across all races in Stockton is greater than many cities in the region.**

4. **Homicide and violence is somewhat less concentrated geographically and somewhat more concentrated socially than other cities in the region.**
1. Actively violent individuals represent less than .25 of 1% of Stockton’s population.
2. Eighteen gangs/groups account for approx. half the homicides in the city.
3. The timing of homicides strongly suggests that just a few of these individuals &/or groups are active at any one time.
4. Many groups are responsible for just a few homicides (11 groups for 1-2 each) and a few groups are responsible for many (10 groups for 48 total).
5. The proportion of “unassigned” group-related homicides and homicides in which the role of groups is unknown is relatively high – though not atypical in the region and California, overall.
1. Given the high rate of serious and/or violent offenses by both victims and offenders, Stockton’s Ceasefire initiative will benefit from a dual focus: (a) on group-related street violence; and (b) on the re-entry process for serious violent offenders.

2. (Note that CDCR and the Stockton Police Department have previously conducted post-release call-ins modeled on Boston’s Re-entry Initiative that had a measurable impact on recidivism and violence.)

3. Post-realignment, these high-rate, serious offenders will re-enter the community via both parole and probation (and/or often directly from local jail commitments).

4. Reliable risk predictors for these offenders include prior offending and, most significantly, patterns of current street violence.
Ceasefire design recommendations based on findings (2)

1. Given, the high rate of “unassigned” group-related homicides and homicides in which the role of groups and individuals is unknown, we recommend a significant ongoing investment in real-time data collection and analysis.

2. The broad distribution of homicide & related violence across Asian, Black and Hispanic groups and individuals recommends a strong investment in diverse and culturally-competent communication and outreach efforts (Call-ins, Custom Notifications, Peacekeeper, community-peace walks, etc.).

3. As we discuss below, we recommend a strong Ceasefire focus on the re-entry process (evidence-based pre- and post-release communication efforts and services) that would benefit from the active participation of CDCR, probation, specialized courts, etc.
Summary recommendation

1. The impact these highest risk young men have on public safety in Stockton & the overall criminal justice system in SJC is enormous & unmatched by any other high risk group.

2. Review: Actively violent individuals represent less than .25 of 1% of Stockton’s population.

3. Review: Eighteen gangs/groups account for approx. half the homicides in the city.

1. Review: Not all of these individuals &/or groups are active at any one time.

1. Recommendation: The joint intensive focus by community and criminal justice system partners on approximately 50-100 (most likely 60-70) very highest risk individuals can produce significant reductions in violence in Stockton. (Less intensive direct communication efforts reach a larger group.)
### Study vs. Main Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Main Outcome</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boston Operation Ceasefire</td>
<td>-63% youth homicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis IVRP</td>
<td>-34% total homicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stockton Operation Peacekeeper</strong></td>
<td><strong>-42% gun homicide</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell PSN</td>
<td>-44% gun assaults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati CIRV</td>
<td>-42% GMI homicide, -22% nonfatal shootings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark Ceasefire</td>
<td>No sig. reduction in gunshot wound incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA Operation Ceasefire</td>
<td>Sig. short-term reduction in violent, gun crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago PSN</td>
<td>-37% homicide, -30% recidivism rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Point DMIs</td>
<td>3 of 4 neighborhoods had -44%-56% in part I UCR crime; all up to -74% in drug offenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashville DMI</td>
<td>-55% reduction in drug offenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockford DMI</td>
<td>-22% non-violent offenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii HOPE</td>
<td>-26% recidivism rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston Re-entry Init.</td>
<td>-30% recidivism for violent crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Effective – imagine flipping a coin 13 times & getting heads 12 times.

2. Communication is key – and the key to effective communication is partnership:
   - Deterrence: Makes highest-risk individuals & groups aware of the risks/costs of violent behavior.
   - Legitimacy: The message is more effective when communicated in a respectful way & in partnership with respected community leaders.

3. Flexible & versatile: Effective across different problems, cities, groups, demographics & economic conditions.
PSN & direct communication: the power of partnership

Percentage decrease in Log(Homicide Rate) associated with a one-unit increase in PSN “treatment”

In Chicago, the impact of direct communication (“call-ins”) on violence was the most powerful part of the strategy.

**N.B.: Random Effects Poisson Regression**
1. Speaking of PSN, this is a rare opportunity for key criminal justice system actors and their community partners to address both violence and recidivism.

2. The ability of this approach to reduce recidivism and facilitate the safe and successful re-entry of highest risk offenders into the community is significant (reductions in recidivism of 30-50%).

3. As the Stockton homicide data shows, successfully interrupting this cycle of offending is central to reducing violence and improving public safety.

4. The Boston Re-entry Initiative and Chicago’s PSN work offer replicable models suitable to Stockton and SJC as shown by the previous CDCR/SPD efforts.
1. Many of the core components (e.g., clergy-community peace walks, enforcement efforts, custom notifications, Peacekeepers) are in motion.

1. The first “call-in” will be convened in early April with 8-10 groups primarily active in south Stockton.

2. Kevin Hatano will initiate a series of community working group meetings intended to mobilize the “helping hands” & moral voice of the community to focus on the individuals, gangs & neighborhoods most deeply affected by violence.

3. The effort will expand citywide over the late summer and/or fall.
“Start-up” recommendations

1. We strongly recommend that Stockton PD develop the capacity to maintain real-time data collection and analysis regarding actively violent groups and individuals.

2. Key criminal justice & community partners must now make specific & well-defined operational commitments to Ceasefire, all focused on these groups & individuals.

3. This includes the efforts of the clergy and community, realignment-specific programs and enforcement units, Peacekeeper, jail cap management, specialized courts, federal enforcement partners and relevant service providers.